As a part of the City of Vancouver’s Civil City Initiative, more than $800,000 has been (controversially) allocated for expansion of the Downtown Vancouver Business Improvement Area (DVBIA) Downtown Ambassador program. Initially, the idea was to offer an incentive for other city BIA’s (such as Gastown, Robson Street, Chinatown, Davie Village, etc.) to use the Downtown Ambassadors and for those BIA’s to be eligible to receive city funding to ‘top up’ any BIA money spent on the program.

The initial version of the policy drafted by City Council only allowed for BIA’s to be eligible for funding if they used the Downtown Ambassadors (rather than any existing, or alternate, security provider). Given that the DVBIA also charges an annual ‘licensing’ fee to any other BIA as well as management fees, the program effectively put a non-profit business association into the security business.

There are so many conflicts of interest, operational and ethical problems with that particular set-up, it’s hard to know where to start.

A subsequent revision of the program expanded the scope so that any business association in the city could apply for money for either an ‘Ambassador’ program or ‘Ambassador-like’ program expansion. There was a fairly thorough vetting process designed to ensure that these other programs met many specific criteria (such as human rights training) before they could be ‘approved’ for funding. Kerrisdale’s existing security program falls into the category of ‘Ambassador-like’.

As a result, The Kerrisdale Business Association, like many other BIA’s in the city, applied to receive money to expand the existing Kerrisdale security program to add approximately three additional day shifts per week. On September 16th Kerrisdale was approved.

Provident has been providing security for the Kerrisdale Business Association (KBA) since 1997… we were originally hired to address a major burglary problem along West 41st Avenue. Working closely with the merchants and KBA, we dramatically reduced the number of burglaries almost immediately. Since that time, the scope of the security program in Kerrisdale has expanded to include daytime patrols as well to address issues like shoplifting, aggressive panhandling and graffiti. There is no question that the security program works well and has provided tremendous value.

KBA members pay 100% of the cost of the security program, and have since 1997.

To the best of my knowledge, only Chinatown and Gastown have had community security programs in place longer. Since then, most BIA’s in the city have since initiated similar patrol programs… many of which sent delegates to Kerrisdale to learn about the specific ways that we’ve been able to achieve such significant results… one of which was the DVBIA.

Following the lead of many other downtown business associations, the DVBIA opted to create their own branded security program … the Downtown Ambassadors.

The increased security will be good for the KBA and it provides additional value for KBA members as well as the Kerrisdale community.

Without question, if any BIA in the city deserves to be eligible for city funding for security, it’s Kerrisdale. Kerrisdale merchants have spent well over $1 million dollars on security services over the past decade and should be first in line for any financial support from the city. Obviously, Provident also stands to benefit financially from this program.

This is not how taxpayer’s money should be spent…

The City is in a unique position in that it can do what no BIA, or other private business in Vancouver, can do… the City can hire Police Officers. They should.

Rather than funding private security guards, the City should spend money dedicating VPD Constables to specific neighbourhoods.

There is no question that you can hire more security guards than police officers for the same amount of money… but it is a question of impact.

In the case of Kerrisdale, there is one full-time VPD Constable shared between Kerrisdale, Oakridge and Marpole… Cst. Ray Gardner.

The impact this one Community Policing Constable, despite being split between the three areas, has had in our neighbourhood is profound. Beyond the consistent and visible Police presence on the street, it enhances our security program. It gives our team an individual person to liaise with and serves to make the investment that the KBA has made in security have much greater impact. Its great for us, our clients, the neighbourhood and the Police themselves.

We are on patrol in the neighbourhood 24 hours a day… anytime we encounter an urgent situation that requires immediate Police response, we call 911. For the vast majority of other issues where Police attendance would be very helpful, we call the Community Policing Centre, or Cst. Gardner, directly.

Because he has the mandate, interest, and time to focus on our neighbourhood, we receive follow-up and assistance that other patrol Constables are simply too busy to be able to provide.

Whether it is responding to calls from merchants regarding shoplifters, following up with youth caught vandalizing property or tagging, educating merchants or being able to spend enough time to get to the bottom of a ladder theft… community policing really works. Rather than having to wait for a situation to escalate to the point where Police response is the only option, we can work with Cst. Gardner to intervene much earlier in the process … allowing both Provident and the VPD to be much more proactive.

If the city wants to get maximum value for the dollars that they are spending to make Vancouver a safer and more ‘civil’ city, it should focus on spending the money in a way that provides unique and maximum value.

There is no question in my mind that having the KOM Community Policing Centre, and specifically Cst, Ray Gardner, has allowed Provident to be much more effective for the KBA.

If there is $800,000.00 to spend, assigning all of it to additional Constables who would be dedicated to provide service to specific neighbourhoods would have a much more profound impact. It would do a lot of things that BIA’s might be surprised by… like making the money that they are already spending on private security much more effective.

The city of Vancouver electrical code requires that every home has 120 volt smoke detectors installed before an Occupancy Permit will be issued. As a result, electricians will always install these ‘regular’ detectors in order to meet the code. Often, homeowners assume that those smoke detectors are being monitored by their alarm system… they rarely are.

Unfortunately, the city code does not yet recognize the superiority of having monitored, low voltage smoke detectors installed in your home.

What’s the difference between a ‘regular’ smoke detector and a monitored, low-voltage version?

Some of the advantages of a monitored, low-voltage smoke detector include:

• They are monitored through the alarm system… in the event of a fire (or the presence of smoke), we’ll know about it within seconds (even faster if you have BLINK);
• Because they are monitored through the alarm, a signal is sent to us to indicate that a detector has lost power or is using a back-up battery;
• the ability to pinpoint exactly which detector is in alarm;

By contrast, when the regular 120 volt detectors trip, they just make a noise… and if the power goes out, they will only last as long as the battery that you’ve installed in it (assuming it works).

This is why you often see homes with two smoke detectors side-by-side (like the photo below)… one is to meet the city electrical code… and one that is connected to the alarm system (either hardwired or wireless).

120Volt Smoke Detectors can be monitored… but are not the best way to go

While devices exist that allow us to connect your alarm to the 120 volt smoke detectors, we find that this practice invariably causes confusion later on… not the least of which is the fact that when any smoke detector in the house trips, all we know is that a fire alarm has tripped, not the exact location, or which specific detector, tripped. This is because 120 Volt detectors are ‘daisy-chained’ when wired… meaning that each detector is connected to a single cable. With low voltage detectors, each device is wired directly to the panel (or sends a wireless signal to the panel) without any ‘sharing’.

Daisy chain wiring creates a lot of frustration and wasted time for clients, the Fire Department and our Technicians when we are trying to troubleshoot why an alarm occurred … because all we know is that there was an alarm, but not the specific location from where it originated.

By contrast, with monitored low voltage detectors, we know immediately that an alarm is coming from the master bedroom smoke detector, or the basement electrical room or the garage, or wherever… giving the Fire Department much better information while they are en-route to your home.

False Alarm Issues

Because one of the most common reasons for smoke detectors tripping is burning something in the kitchen, clients invariably end up disconnecting the 120 volt smoke detector closest to the kitchen.

For this reason, we recommend that those ‘regular’ smoke detectors NOT be connected to the alarm. Instead, we install low voltage smoke detectors, designed to be remotely monitored, outside of each bedroom and in the basement… never anywhere near the kitchen.

Another advantage of low-voltage smoke detectors over the 120 volt ones is aesthetics. In many new residential projects, we are installing a flush-mount detector. The photo below shows one installed in our Kerrisdale showroom. While it is several times as expensive as a regular detector, it is the only flush mounted design that I have seen that really works.

The photo isn’t great, but it shows the smoke detector in the top right corner along with a small pot light and a ceiling mounted motion detector. Please feel free to stop by our showroom at 2309 West 41st Avenue if you would like to see how it looks installed.

What should you do?

1. Determine if your existing smoke detectors are monitored or not (call your alarm company and ask);

2. If your smoke detectors are more than 3 years old, consider having them replaced… if they are more than 5 years old, definitely have them replaced;

3. If you only have 120 Volt smoke detectors installed, consider having monitored low voltage smoke detectors added to your system (they can be either hardwired or wireless).

Friday’s fire at a UBC condo serves as yet another example of why remote management for access control systems is so important.

For those who didn’t catch the story… A fire started (sounds like from a BBQ) on a 3rd floor patio at the building… neighbours called the Fire Department reporting seeing smoke billowing (no smoke detectors in the suite??) … when the Fire Department arrived, they could not get into the building because the building had an access control system that required a keyfob to both unlock the front door as well as control the elevator.

As CTV reported, precious minutes were wasted when Fire Fighters arrived on scene because they were unable to gain entry to the building because of its access control system. (Click here to view CTV’s photo gallery of the fire)

Sadly, like most buildings in Vancouver that have access control systems (where you use a card or key-fob to unlock your door), the systems are designed with more marketing in mind than actual ‘security’. A security system should not put you at greater risk in the event that Police, Fire or Paramedics are urgently needed.

Here is the text from an article I wrote last year for Canadian Property Management Magazine that outlines the solution to this completely avoidable problem…

In February 2006 the Vancouver Police received a call from a distraught woman who said she was being beaten by her husband and needed help. When Police arrived at the downtown highrise where the call originated, they found the front doors locked and had to use the building’s intercom to dial the suite. The phone was answered by a male who simply said “She’s fine” and hung up.

When the Police tried to get into the building by dialing other residents on the intercom, they learned that although any resident could buzz them into the front lobby, the security system was designed so that only a resident on the 18th floor could allow the elevator to open on the that floor. For security reasons, none of the suite numbers were displayed on the intercom. As a result, the Police were forced to choose between randomly selecting between hundreds of residents to find one who actually lived on the same floor as where the 911 call originated, or break into the stairwell and climb 18 stories.

As pointed out in the Vancouver Province column that discussed the incident, this is not an uncommon occurrence for the Police. In fact, it has become a big enough issue that the VPD created a program called ‘Project Access’.

‘Project Access’ calls for construction companies and strata councils to install a lockbox, which would be accessible by the VPD Sergeant on duty. Inside the tube would be a full access key fob or card.

The fact that the Police cannot quickly access a building in an emergency is clearly a huge problem… and is only going to get worse. However, I strongly recommend AGAINST any building using any type of lockbox. The Fire Department has used lockboxes for years, and theft from these boxes has always been a major concern. Irrespective of construction, and even if the box itself is monitored as a part of the alarm system, an external lockbox presents an unnecessary risk to condo owners.

If the lockbox gets broken into, a thief can gain full access to the building.

The best solution is remote management.

Remote management of building access control systems solve two very serious risks: 1) as described above, the difficulty for emergency responders to gain access to the building, and 2) it eliminates the risks associated with having an access control system managed through a PC located on-site and operated by a resident manager.

The way this service works is that rather than an access control system’s database being held on a PC located at the client site (which in itself is a huge security risk) the database is moved to a secured server located in a high-security, central monitoring station.

Using either dial-up or broadband connections, security firms (that have the proper infrastructure) are able to remotely manage the database, including adding, modifying or deleting users as well as make regular database back-ups.

With a fully managed system, off-site security can talk to the Police, verify their identity, view them live on camera as well as remotely unlock the front door and control the elevator for them.

Another common failure of most building access control systems is the lack of professional management of the system. In most cases, the database that controls the system is ‘managed’ by a resident manager, concierge or other person for whom database management is not a full-time job. The result is often that new users get added into the system, but regular audits are not performed and many keyfobs and cards for former residents/tenants are left in the system. Further, because the system is being maintained on a single PC, the access control software is at significant risk of data loss due to hard drive failure, improper back-up procedures as well as the risk of the physical theft of the PC itself.

The fewer key fobs/cards in circulation, the better. Even more important, each and every keyfob must be assigned to a single person to maximize accountability. Remote access control system management maximizes the effectiveness of any building’s system and ensures that the fewest possible ‘holes’ in security exist.

Rather than waiting until a serious incident occurs in your building, answer the following questions:

1. Where is the database for your access control system physically located? Is it secure? Is it backed-up? How often?
2. Is entry to the parking garage tracked in the same way that entry through a door is? (ie. Do you know exactly who opened the garage door and when? Or does everyone have a generic ‘clicker’ that is not individually assigned?)
3. Does your building still use lockboxes for the Fire Department, or anyone else?
4. Is the building’s telephone room secured with its own separate alarm system?
5. When was the last time you had a security professional (that knew what they were talking about) provide a thorough audit of your building?

Over the past week or so, I’ve had quite a few conversations with people about the UBC Bill Reid thefts at the Museum of Anthropology. In most of those discussions, everyone seems to share the opinion that there are two plausible scenarios that appear most likely, 1) that the security at UBC is incredibly inept; or 2) someone on the inside was in on the job.

The CBC seems to have confirmed the answer to that question.

The whole incident is a sad example of how important the human element is in a security system. You can spend millions of dollars on security technology, but if nothing happens when an alarm is received… any possible value is eliminated.

Alarms are not much of a deterrent anymore… and any deterrent value they do have is reduced each day as more alarms are installed. If your alarm trips, and noone comes, you don’t have security. It doesn’t matter what it cost or how cool the technology is. The only purpose for an alarm is to generate an immediate response.

If what you are protecting is irreplaceable and really important, you cannot have any single points of failure anywhere in the security process… from the detection devices installed, to the monitoring equipment that receive the signals to the response procedures for the people responsible for doing something about them.

CBC has just reported that the burglary at the Museum was detected by the alarm, but that no response occurred. This, despite the fact that multiple alarm zones were received and that several cameras ‘went offline’ four hours before the incident.

Apparently, alarms were received at Campus Security and nothing was done.

The guard who was supposed to be on-duty at the time of the burglary was on a smoke break and never noticed/reported the burglary… which, as a result (they didn’t say what he was doing for the balance of his shift) was not discovered until shift change.

Some of the first questions that come to mind:

1. Why would UBC Security have not followed up on the alarm? Given the CBC report, it sounds like several alarm zones tripped… indicating a likely burglary. Apparently, no one responded… the central dispatch must have known that they had one guard onsite… wouldn’t they have at least checked in on him to ensure his safety? What if he had been attacked by the burglars? Sounds like he would have also not been discovered until shift change if that had happened.
2. If there were “audible alarms”, how far away was the guard taking his smoke break?
3. I’m assuming that because the CBC reported that “four hours before the theft occurred several key cameras went offline” , and that the thieves used bear spray and were wearing gas masks (a tactic that was used in at least one Westside residential burglary last year), that other cameras must have been working. Why wouldn’t those working cameras have been checked after the alarms were received?
4. With respect to the cameras that went offline… if the digital video recorder (DVR) that was connected to those cameras was programmed correctly, that in itself should have created an alarm that required response and inspection. Was the DVR being monitored for camera failure or hard-drive failure?

From this new information, it sounds as though the break-down in the Museum’s security system was both technical as well as procedural.

Leaving the security of some of Canada’s most important, and valuable artwork, in the hands of one guy on a smoke break seems like a broken system to me.

Even the greatest security guard in the world (it’s pretty clear the particular guard in this scenario does not fit into that category) will need a break during any shift… not having systems and procedures in place to provide redundancy in this regard is a fundamental flaw in the any security system.

Depending on what you are protecting, that might be considered a reasonable risk… but if you are guarding irreplaceable national treasures… not so much.

The Museum of Anthropology has offered a $50,000 reward for information leading to the safe return of the stolen Bill Reid pieces. Photos and descriptions of each item can be seen on their website by clicking here.

With respect to the obvious security lapse, I’m shocked that the Museum continues, at least publicly, to suggest that their security is ‘appropriate’.

Here is a quote from today’s Sun… “But museum director Anthony Shelton said that elaborate computer program printouts have determined that the museum’s security system did not fail during the heist and that the construction of the building’s layout did not compromise security.”

… elaborate computer printouts? Why would you need that? Given that the items were stolen, isn’t that solid enough proof that the system failed?

Either the system failed or was improperly designed/programmed in the first place (which would still be a ‘failure’). It’s a black or white issue. (Keeping in mind that a ‘security alarm’ is not a ‘security system’).

Protecting a museum is no different, in principle, than protecting a home… there are two fundamental security concepts that must be addressed. First, you need to ensure that you have five minute proofed everything that you are trying to protect and second, you must create redundancies so that there is no single point of failure. That’s it. The rest is implementation.

The fact is, there are many different technologies that could or should have been in place at the Museum to prevent, or at the very least, detect this incident as it was happening. And if they were detected, multiple levels of redundancy to ensure that appropriate response was under way.

I demonstrate a few of those technologies during both of the interviews linked to below…

Newspapers throughout Canada, and the United States, reported today about the theft of several of Bill Reid’s works from the UBC Museum of Anthropology. Here are links to the Province, CBC and the Seattle Times (all more or less the exact same).

While I only know as much about this incident as has been reported so far in the media, and the Police are yet to tell the public what they know about it (that will happen Monday)… I am surprised that the level of security at the Museum was low enough to allow this to happen.

Protecting artwork can be tricky, it is certainly not as easy as installing a magnet or motion detector in a regular home… but it can certainly be done.

For many of our clients who have valuable artwork, one of the simplest security measures we take is to install either a hardwired or wireless contact so that as soon as the piece is moved, the alarm trips. In most cases, because of the value of the frame, a small, flat wireless contact is best because they can be attached without causing any damage to the artwork.

Most importantly though, these contacts are assigned to their own separate partition on the alarm system, which is programmed to be on 24 hours a day (the same way we program smoke detectors). This way, no one ever needs to remember to arm/disarm the artwork… it is always on. This is a simple programming decision that completely eliminates the risk of someone either ‘forgetting’ to arm the system or being able to disarm the system if under duress (without sending a panic signal).

For pieces of art that are not so easy to apply a contact to, a properly designed video system often works best. If you are trying to protect a sculpture, sitting on a table in the middle of the room, a camera gets mounted somewhere close by with a very clear view of the space surrounding the piece. Using separate software (or hardware depending on the application), the system is programmed for several ‘rules’. One example might be that movement will be allowed 3 feet away from the piece, but as soon as anything (like a hand) comes within a pre-defined zone around the object an audible alarm will sound. A second rule would send an alarm signal if that hand, or whatever, moves within 10 inches of the piece.

We use systems like this to create an alarm when someone climbs over a fence, but ignore when someone comes through the gate properly or to send an alarm when someone has been standing in front of a store window for too long during early morning hours. This technology allows us to use a camera as an intelligent motion detector that is able to distinguish between activity that is ‘ok’ versus that that is likely to be suspicious. There are thousands of possible applications for this technology, and a museum is certainly a perfect place for it to be deployed.

Using a video system in this manner is infinitely more useful that having a security guard, or anyone, sitting in front of a bank of monitors trying to watch what is going on. When applied appropriately, video analytics can allow for the alarm system to send a signal while someone is still just thinking about stealing something, as opposed to after they have already done so.

Of course, many levels of security need to be in place at each stage to prevent and detect any kind of tampering with the system.

The most obvious weak point of any system, whether in a museum or home, is the telephone lines. There is little value in spending a bunch of money on security devices but not dealing with the risk of the system being compromised by someone cutting the phone lines. The BLINK network is by far the best and most secure option for anyone on the Westside or in Yaletown… outside of those areas, digital cellular back-up will work best.

Without question, the single most effective security tactic is to five-minute proof your belongings…

Many media outlets throughout Canada are reporting on a sad story in Calgary where an 18-month old boy died after waiting more than 30 minutes for an ambulance to arrive. The boy’s Aunt called 911 immediately upon recognizing that her nephew was in distress, but because the family was using VoIP telephone service, the call for help did not go to Calgary EMS… instead it went to a different call centre, somewhere else, and help never arrived. It wasn’t until the neighbour called 911 on a regular analog telephone (after 15-20 minutes of waiting) that Paramedics were actually dispatched.

The VoIP service in this case was provided by a company called Comwave who are similar to companies like Vonage who provide unfacilitated VoIP.

I’ve talked about this issue for a long time in dozens of seminars, in media interviews and on this blog. I think that the marketing of these VoIP services is incredibly misleading… Many people only find out after a burglary, or in this case, after they try unsuccessfully to call 911, that there are very real risks of using VoIP service.

The quick explanation of the issue, in my opinion, is this:

VoIP service can be broken down into two different ‘types’… Facilitated VoIP and unfacilitated VoIP… ‘facilitated’ services are provided by cable companies like Shaw (with their Shaw Digital Phone service) who have their own network, whereas providers like Comwave and Vonage are ‘unfacilitated’ and send data over the internet.

The important distinction is that with ‘unfacilitated’ VoIP providers NEITHER 911 OR YOUR ALARM SYSTEM WILL WORK. In terms of marketing talk to try and gloss over that fact, Comwave refers to ‘Enhanced 911′ service on their site…. when you read the FAQ section, it’s clear that the ‘enhancement’ that they refer to is that when you call 911, your call will not go to 911, but instead to their (or someone’s) 3rd party monitoring station who will then try to re-route your call to the local 911. Rather than spelling out the very real risk that their service provides, they instead refer to that risk as an enhancement. Unfortunately, that is typical in the VoIP industry. Obviously, the family of the boy who died did not know about how this ‘enhancement’ could impact them.

I’ve written a lot about Shaw Digital Phone, enough so that they sent me a C&D letter to stop using their logo… but at least 911 will work with their service. The main issue that I have raised with Shaw is the inconsistency of the speed of alarm signal transmission over their network… and also that they market their ‘facilitated’ VoIP as not being VoIP… which is completely untrue. Although it is understandable why they would try to distance themselves from the Comwave and Vonage’s of the world, the fact still remains though that their service is a form of VoIP.

The bottom line is that if you use any form of VoIP, you need to test your alarm and, more importantly, know exactly where your 911 call will end up. With respect to your alarm system, some form of wireless communication should be used… either cellular back-up, or for our clients, BLINK mesh radio.

Your security is in your redundancy … and if you are looking to save a few dollars on your monthly phone bill, make sure you know exactly what risks might come along with a lower price tag.

To read more about what I’ve written on this topic, click on the following:

Does anyone know that your alarm isn’t working?

Shaw Digital Phones and Alarms

Shaw Digital Telephone Services Affect on Alarm Systems

Rogers Home Phone vs. Shaw Digital Phone

Clear as a bell one day, fuzzy and garbled the next

Recently, ABC7 News in San Francisco ran stories about a Utah-based security firm, Firstline Security, using a new version of an old and wide-spread, security industry sales tactic/trick. The pitch has a few variations, but is typically some version of a salesperson offering homeowners a “free” alarm system in exchange for allowing the company to put a sign in their front yard.

Not satisfied with simply scamming clients, Firstline also looked to scam their own employees… by creating a fake reality show called ‘The Prodigy’. The company recruited on University campuses throughout the United States.

By offering a $1,000,000.00 prize, Firstline ‘hired’ several thousand college students to compete by selling ‘free’ security systems to homeowners throughout the United States.

Of course, not only was the supposed reality show a scam, so were the actual system ‘installations’. If you watch the video clips by following the links below, you may recognize that the equipment that Firstline was selling is the exact alarm that I discussed in my post ‘Why Millions of Home Alarms are Useless‘. Independent of the equipment itself being suspect, based on hundreds of consumer complaints, it appears as though many of the systems were never even connected for actual monitoring.

ABC7′s first story talked about the fake reality show and can be seen by clicking here. After it aired, they received enough complaints from viewers that they did two follow-up stories.

The other segments are:

1. Consumers get faulty alarm systems
   
2. Reality Show Producer talks to ABC7

Apparently, Firstline is back recruiting on campus again for their next summertime assault.

Although the reality show spin was unique, the pitch of “we’ll give you a free alarm system if you let us put our lawn sign up” is used by hundreds of companies all over the US and Canada. The companies who offer the ‘free’ system are most often selling the signed contract to a third party, normally ADT, Monitronics, or another large security firm that purchases bulk accounts. In this case mentioned above, Firstline was selling the contracts to Monitronics in Texas.

It sounds like Firstline figured that in order to really ramp-up sales, they were going to need to simultaneously scam consumers as well as the employees selling to them.

David Cay Johnston is a NY Times reporter who has written a new book called ‘Free Lunch: How the Wealthiest Americans Enrich Themselves at Government Expense (and Stick you with the Bill)’ that is getting a fair amount of press in the States.

In addition to the typical targets like Wal-Mart that you might expect a book like this to discuss, Johnston devotes an entire chapter to the alarm industry… referring to the fact that police response to burglar alarms is an incredibly costly and ineffective use of taxpayers money.

In essence, he is saying the same thing that I have said on this blog and in several interviews… that the alarm industry is a parasite on the Police and is profiting through making a bad problem worse.

Here is a quote:

“The burglar alarm industry charges hefty fees for a service that costs it very little. Then the industry dumps onto the taxpayers the real costs of providing the very service it sells. This is economic pollution sold to people under the guise of making them safe. In fact, it makes them less safe.”

I was interviewed a couple weeks ago by Security Systems News, an American trade journal that was writing a story about the book. I was the lone industry voice (at least in the article) that was agreeing with Johnston. Click here to read the SSN story.

There is absolutely no question that police response to burglar alarms is a collossal waste of taxpayers money. With a false alarm rate of 98%, taxpayers throughout North America are getting fleeced by helping subsidize the alarm industry.. in effect allowing it to sell an incomplete service and get rich doing so.

What’s worse then the fact that the alarm industry is offloading the crucial component of its ‘service’ to the Police, is the fact that Police response itself, irrespective of who pays for it, is virtually useless.

The simple fact is that with a 98% false alarm rate (70% of which are caused by user error), Police Departments throughout North America cannot, and will not, provide immediate response. Instead, they require that an effort is made to ‘verify’ the alarm. This involves calling the alarmed premises, and in the case of ‘enhanced call verification‘ making a second call to the alarm owner, before dispatching the Police. This process all but ensures that by the time the Police are notified of the alarm, any incident that might have taken place will be long over. Unless a neighbour or some other human being actually calls 911 to report a burglary in progress, the Police are not going to respond anytime soon.

A burglar alarm is not a deterrent… it’s only purpose is to provide information that has an incredibly short shelf life. Unless response to the alarm is immediate, there is incredibly little value offered by a monitored alarm.

I’ve written about this topic a few times, here are links to three relevant posts…

1. The Alarm Industry is a Parasite on the Police
2. Provident vs. Alarmforce on CKNW
3. Burglar Alarms: an ‘Unneccessary Burden’?

On a more positive note, about what you actually should be doing, read ‘Five Minute Proofing‘ … in my experience, Five Minute Proofing is the most effective tactic that you can use to reduce your risk of being a victim. Of course, what is essential for Five Minute Proofing to be of value is that response to your alarm is immediate… the reason that Police response doesn’t work is that it is very hard, if not impossible, to ‘One Hour Proof’.